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Abstract
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high-
lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with
empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence of
heterogeneous types (heterogeneity in rules for changing behavior) within a popu-
lation, and in particular the sustainability of altruism (presence of unconditional
cooperators) even in case of strong social dilemma. This explanation constitutes
an alternative to the choice and refusal mechanism that is often presented as an
explanation for cooperation on dynamic networks. We also exhibit a minimal set of
strategies for emergence of cooperation (altruists, reciprocators and selfish agents)
and sketch a two steps scenario for this emergence. We adopt an hybrid methodology
with both analytical and computational insights.
Key words: prisoner's dilemma, cultural evolution, endogenous social networks,
selection of interactions, evolutionary games, heterogeneous agents, heterogeneous
equilibrium
Introduction
Emergence of cooperation under natural selection pressure as long been a puz-
zle for evolutionary game theory, which traditionally considers agents interacting
at random within the population. However, new insights have been obtained since
modelers recently started to take into account networks and their dynamics in the
modeling of interactions. Besides structural and topological constraints that deter-
mines the possibilities and conditions of interactions (who can interact with who),
activity networks (who is actually interacting with who) are emergent patterns of
social activities. People meet each other, interact, learn from these interactions and
eventually keep previous partners in mind as potential future partners. These emer-
gent networks from agent's activities strongly influence their outcomes, thus leading
to a reciprocal dependency between agents' activities and the networks they form.
To give some insights into the interplay between social activities and the under-
lying evolving social networks, this papers analyzes a model of emergence of coop-
eration on dynamic networks. We choose the prisoner's dilemma game as a case
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Table 1: The matrix of the prisoner's dilemma game
Player A Player B
C D
C (r, r) (0, 1)
D (1, 0) (p, p)
study since it is known to be the worst situation for cooperative dyadic outcomes,
compared to other related games such as the Chicken game.
We determine the conditions for emergence of cooperation from an all defecting
population and show how heterogeneous population states, with both cooperators
and defectors, can be stable thanks to emergent structures of the activity network.
This work builds on a model previously introduced [1] and proposes an alternative to
the cliquishness or "choice and refusal mechanism" that often stand for explanations
of cooperation.
1. The prisoner's dilemma on networks
A prisoner's dilemma game (PD game) is a two players game which payoffs matrix
has a structure described by table 1 with the conditions 0 < p < r < 1.
The prisoner's dilemma game belongs to the class of social dilemmas and has
become a paradigm for modeling cooperation and altruistic behavior, i.e. situations
where one achieves an action that benefits to the other at its own expense. The
dilemma lays in the fact that option D (defect) leads always to the highest reward
whatever the other does. But when both players choose D, they finally receive less
than if both had played C (since p > r). This means that mutual cooperation is
always more profitable than mutual defection (collective rationality), but given the
opponent's action, defection is always individually more profitable than cooperation
(individual rationality). The prisoner's dilemma is thus a prototype of situations
where there is a dilemma between individual and collective rationalities.
The game can be played several times in a row or only once ; players can play
simultaneously or sequentially. In this paper, we will study repeated sequential PD
game. The repeated sequential form of the prisoner's dilemma can be useful to
model social interactions based on the mutual gift, as described for example in [19],
or trust ([7], [13]). The recent access to huge databases related to sequential social
interactions (phone calls, mails, posts on blogs, etc.) constitute also a new source of
applications of PD game modeling ([16]), with perspectives of empirical validation.
Experimental studies based on the prisoner's dilemma game generally conclude
that the level of cooperation observed in human population is not consistent with
non-cooperative game theory predictions ([6]; [13] for the sequential form). In par-
ticular, one of the most puzzling phenomena observed in experimental studies is that
among the various behaviors encountered, there is often a substantial proportion of
altruist behaviors, i.e. unconditional cooperators [2]. Behaviors observed in experi-
mental studies can be roughly categorized into three types: selfish players, who most
of the time defect, conditional cooperators, who cooperate if the other player did,
and altruist players, which most of the time cooperate whatever the other did. If het-
erogeneity in agent's types is addressed in some models, few of them explain how it
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can be maintained, and even fewer explain how it can emerge from an homogeneous
population of selfish players.
Recent literature demonstrated that the topology of social networks can help
to sustain cooperation ([4] ; [3] ; [14]; [10]). One of the main conclusions of these
studies is that cooperation is favored by a high degree of cliquishness of the activity
networks and the possibility of refusing interaction. This is a motivation to consider
models with partner selection where the topology and weights of the activity network
are emergent properties.
In the following, we will propose a mechanism of endogenous network forma-
tion that could stand for an alternative to the cliquishness or "choice and refusal"
mechanism in the explanation of emergence and sustainability of cooperation with
heterogeneous population.
1.1. The model: why address books are important
Let P be a population of N agents playing PD game in discrete-time. The game
is played sequentially: an agent (the first mover) announce its play (C or D), and
its partner (the second mover) reacts accordingly. For example, someone can post
a message on the blog of a friends, and this latter can answer (or not) with a post
on the first mover's blog. We will assume that at each period, each agent has the
opportunity to play only once as a first mover (this can be interpreted as a time
constraint).
Agents keep in their address book the names of their partners for all previous
successful interactions as first mover ((C,C) or (D,C) outcomes). Names in agent
i address book will be called its relationships and agents having i in their address
book will be called its friends.
We will consider a complete graph for the network of accessibility (first movers
can choose any agent in the population, like for mail, comments post or phone calls).
The network of activity defined by the set of all address books will be an emergent
evolving directed weighted network.
Agents can choose their partners to some extent:
• With a probability (1− e), e ∈ [0, 1], first movers can choose their partners in
their address book, thus taking advantage of what they have learned so far. If
their address book if empty, they are matched at random in the population.
• With a probability e, first movers are matched at random in the population.
Parameter e can be interpreted as an uncertainty level in the partner selection pro-
cess or as an exogenous structural factor (e.g. some competencies an agent needs are
sometime not present in its address book). We will notice that e = 1 corresponds to
the classical approach of evolutionary game theory for which is as been proved that
cooperation is not sustainable.
Agents start their life with empty address books and do friends and relationships
during social interactions.
1.2. The strategies
A period of the game unfolds as follows:
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Figure 1: Interactions as first and second movers. Each round, an agent can play several times as
a second mover, but only once as first mover.
1. Each agent is matched as first mover with a partner according to rules given
above,
2. Each agent does a proposition (C or D) to its partner,
3. Each agent answers (D or C) as a second mover to every agent that has chosen
it.
At a given period, an agent can thus play several times as a second mover, but only
once as first mover.
The set S of strategies is constituted of the three types mentioned previously:
altruist, reciprocator and selfish agents in proportion γ, δ and 1−γ−δ. These types
are defined by their behaviors as first mover (table 2) and as second mover (table
3). Their proportions evolve in the simplex 4 = {(γ, δ)|δ + γ ≤ 1; γ ≥ 1; δ ≥ 1}
. We will assume that agents know the proportions of the different types in the
population1 so that they can compute their expected payoffs E as first mover and
can play accordingly : E(C) = (γ + δ)r ; E(D) = (1 − γ)p + (γ). The condition
under which E(C) > E(D) is thus δ > p
r
+ (1−p−r)γ
r
Although they are stylized types, these strategies will give some insight into the
phenomena that could potentially stabilize cooperation.
1.3. The evolutionary dynamics
At the end of a period, fitness of agents are defined as the sum of all their dyadic
interactions payoffs at this period. These payoffs are assumed to be linked to a
reproductive success: agents have a probability (1− θ) to die at the end of period.
Each died agent is replaced by a new agent according to a replicator dynamics
so that the population size is kept constant: with a probability proportional to its
fitness, one agent is chosen at random in the population, and a new agent of the
same type with an empty address book is created (overlapping generation game).
1More sophisticated model would assume that agents learn these proportions from the outcome
of their previous interactions
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Table 2: Behaviors of first movers in function of the state (γ, δ) of the population.
First Mover
Type In address Book random
(with relationships)
Selfish Search for an altruist and play D. C if δ > pr +
(1−p−r)γ
r
If none play C
Reciprocator Pick a name at random C if δ > pr +
(1−p−r)γ
r
and play C
Altruist Pick a name at random C
and play C
Table 3: Behaviors of agents as second movers.
Type Second Mover
Selfish D
Reciprocator Do what first mover did.
Altruist C
2. Analytical and computational study
We will now give some analytical and computational insights into this model.
One of the stylized fact we want to reconstruct is the existence of areas in the (e, p)
parameter space where we find stable heterogeneous population with significant level
of cooperation. This means that the dynamics under study shall have an internal
attractor in ∆.
Given the complexity of the model, an analytical study will necessarily adopt
some approximations ( e.g. infinite population size assumption). On the other hand,
computational studies can never guaranty that the number of time-steps considered
in simulations is sufficiently high to distinguish a very slow evolution toward an
homogenous population from the existence of an internal attractor. When the vector
fields tends to zeros and when there no way to assess convergence, simulations are
poorly informative about internal attractors.
Our methodology is thus to find an analytical approximation of the model (2.1)
and check that it fits well the simulated model (2.2). Then understand cooperation
in the analytical model (3.1), characterize internal attractors (3.2) and study one of
these internal attractors to understand how network patterns can sustain coopera-
tion in heterogeneous population (3.3). Then we will see to what extent the choice
of the strategy set is important to observe these phenomena (4).
2.1. The fitness function
We can see from table 2 that behaviors of agents vary in function of the sign of
δ− p
r
. The part of ∆ concerned by the problem of emergence of cooperation contains
the point (0, 0) corresponding to an homogeneous populations of selfish agents. The
interesting area for our study is thus defined by δ < p
r
+ (1−p−r)γ
r
. For sake of clarity,
we give in this paper the analytical approximation of expected payoffs for this area
only.
Theorem 1. For an infinite population defined by (γ, δ) ∈ ∆, with the approxi-
mation that the proportions of types in population are constant at the agents' time
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scales, the mean expected payoffs pia, pir and pis (for altruists, reciprocators and
selfish agents respectively) in the domain δ < p
r
+ (1−p−r)γ
r
are given by:
pis = (1− e)(2p(1− γ + θ(γ − 1)) + γ
1 + θ(γ − 1) +
(1− θ)γ
1− (1− (δ + γ))θ ) + 2e(p(1− γ) + γ)
pir = (1−e)(θγ(r + 2p− 1) + γ + 2p(1− γ − θ)
1 + θ(γ − 1) +
rγ
1− (1− (δ + γ))θ )+e(2p+γ(1−2p+r))
pia = (1− e)( rθδ
1 + θ(γ − 1) +
r(2γ + δ)
1− (1− (δ + γ))θ ) + er(δ + 2γ)
Proof. 1 Proof given in appendix.
.
From this payoffs expressions, the relative fitness for each type is given by:
fi =
pii− < pi >
< pi >
(1)
where < pi >= γpia + δpir + (1− δ − γ)pis
Whether cooperation will develop in the population will depend on e, r and p.
For sake of convenience and clarity we will adopt a standard parametrization of
the PD game matrix: r = (1 − p). This enables to reduce the parameter space
to two free parameters e and p which helps for visualization. Intuitively, p fixes
the strength of the social dilemma: the higher p, the stronger the dilemma. In
the following, attractors and analytical trajectories are computed by solving these
equations numerically.
2.2. Comparison between analytical and computational results
We first can compare the dynamics of the analytical model and the simulated
model. We present here the comparison for the parameters: θ = 0.99, e = 0.3 and
p = 0.3 (thereafter referred as settings 1). We ran 10 simulations and collected data
on types' proportions in population, address books and payoffs. Initial conditions
are (γ, δ) = (0.1, 0.1) and N = 500. Initial rate of cooperation for first move play is
thus 10%.
As expected from the analytical study (fig. 2 - circles on the graph), the popula-
tion converges toward a full cooperative state with a mixed population of altruists
and reciprocators. Cooperation has become sustainable and selfish agents have dis-
appeared.
We can also check that the stationary environment approximation made in propo-
sition 1 is quite reasonable: the time between two markers (circles) represents one
generation. The proximity of two successive markers indicates that the environment
of an agent does not change much during its lifespan. This approximation will al-
ways be satisfied around an internal attractor since it is the place where the vector
field tends to zero (the fitness function is continuous in ∆◦).
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Figure 2: Comparison between analytical predictions and simulations. For e = 0.3, p = 0.3,
θ = 0.99 the theoretical analysis predicts very well the behavior of the system. Line with circles:
Analytical prediction of the trajectory in case of infinite population size. Dotted lines: plots of 10
independent simulations with N = 500. Each circle is separated by 100 periods i.e. the agents'
mean lifetime expectancy.
3. Cooperation, social activity and network formation
We will now see what we can learn from this model and its infinite population
size approximation about the role of network formation in emergence of cooperation.
3.1. Cooperation and social activity
To better understand the reasons of the convergence towards a fully cooperative
state in settings 1, we can turn toward the analysis of the structure of social inter-
actions for each type of agent in the infinite population approximation. From the
analytical study, we can compute the theoretical level of activity for each type in
function of δ and γ, i.e. the mean number of interactions per period. This provides
information about the degree of involvement in social interactions for each type of
agent. Let's define the relative activity for altruists RAa (resp. reciprocators RAr)
as the ratio between the mean number of interactions per period for altruists (resp.
reciprocators) and the mean number of interactions per period for selfish agents as
a function of (γ, δ).
Details about the computation of these relative activities are given in appendix.
We can observe on figure 3 that: a) these two ratios are always greater than one,
which means that selfish agents are the less active in the social network (they don't
have friends actually); b) altruists are the most active of all types, especially when
in small proportion.
This example illustrates the way altruists can be successful even in presence of
selfish agents: they are more active than everybody else. Since altruists are the only
ones to cooperate as second mover, they are the only one to become friends with
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Figure 3: Theoretical relative activities for reciprocators and altruists (0.1 < γ < 0.9 and 0.1 <
δ < 0.4 ; e = 0.3 and p = 0.3, θ = 0.99). Upper surface : relative activity of altruists ; lower
surface: relative activity for reciprocators
. The plotted trajectory is the projection on this surface of the theoretical
trajectory of figure 3
reciprocators, and consequently they do relationships faster than other types. Al-
truists are more popular. The fact that their selfish partners cheat them is balanced
by the fact that they are more appreciated as second mover partners in the social
network.
3.2. Looking for heterogeneous equilibriums
An interesting question concerning the infinite population size approximation
concerns the existence of internal attractors. What about the stylized fact presented
in the introduction: stable heterogeneous populations of altruists, reciprocators and
selfish agents? Given (e, p, θ) ∈]0, 1[×]0, 0.5[×]0, 1[, the replicators dynamics is de-
termined by the folowing vector field V in the simplex ∆:
Vδ =
δpir
γpia − δpir − (1− δ − γ)pie − δ |e,p
Vγ =
γpia
γpia − δpir − (1− δ − γ)pie − γ |e,p
A point (δ, γ) ∈ ∆◦ ∩ (]0, 1[×]0, p
(1−p) [) is an internal attractors only if:
V 2γ + V
2
δ = 0 |e,p (2)
We solved numerically equation 2 to get the set of internal attractors for a given
value of θ. Figure 4 displays the set of pairs (e, p) for which the dynamics has an
internal attractor. This set has a non-empty interior and for θ = 0.99 it is crab's
claw shaped and oriented along the line p = 0.5 − 0.35e. As shown on the figure,
the rate of cooperation at the attractor decreases in the population along this line,
which means that, as expected, e has a negative impact on cooperation. Figure 5
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Figure 4: Existence of internal attractors in the (e, p) space. The level of gray is indexed on the
rate of cooperation at the attractor (the darker, the less cooperative). This has been obtained from
Equ. 2 solved by numerical analysis for θ = 0.99. The arrow points to the pairs (e, p) corresponding
to the simulation presented in fig. 6.
displays the set of pairs (γ, δ) that are internal attractors for some value of e and
p. We can see that most of these attractors are situated above the line y = x,
which means that there are generally more reciprocators than altruists at internal
attractors. This is in line with experimental studies.
Last, we can study the influence of the life expectancy, which is also the ratio
between the network updating timescale and the population renewal timescale. If
cooperation disappears for very low life expectancy (e.g. θ = 0.5), we observe
cooperation and internal attractors as soon as θ = 0.9, which means that cooperation
is quite robust against variations of life expectancy.
3.3. Patterns in the emergent network
With this map of attractors from the analytical study, we can look at the struc-
ture of internal attractors in the simulated model and check, passing, that the ana-
lytical model predicts well the existence and location of internal attractors for the
simulated model. For example, a simulation ran for 25.000 time steps for θ = 0.99,
e = 0.7 and p = 0.25 (thereafter referred as settings 2 - the arrow on fig. 5) has a
trajectory that cycles around the analytically predicted attractor, which corroborate
the existence of an internal attractor despite the hight value of e. Its location is close
to the one predicted by this analytical insight (fig. 6).
The analysis of the structure of the emergent social network at this internal
attractor helps us to understand the interplay between the dynamics of the activity
network and emergence of cooperation. In directed networks, important vertices can
be defined in terms of hubs and authorities2 [15].
2If a vertex points to many vertices with large authority weight, then it should receive a large
hub weight. If many vertices with large hub weight point to a vertex, this latter should receive a
large authority weight.
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Figure 5: Location of attractors in the (γ, δ) space obtained from numerical solution of Equ. 2.
Each point represents an attractor for some value of (e, p) (fig 4.).
Figure 6: A case of internal attractor (e = 0.7, p = 0.25, θ = 0.99) : For some values of e and p,
a society starting from an almost all-defecting state (19% of D-first-mover reciprocators, 80% of
selfish agents, 1% of altruists ) evolves toward an internal attractor with a mixed population of
the three types. The simulation presented here is 25 000 periods long, corresponding to 250 mean
lifetime expectancy. The black line represents the theoretical evolution in an infinite population and
the theoretical attractor is situated in the center of the black square. With finite population size
(here 1000 agents), the population cycles around the attractor. Asymmetries in the vector field's
strength around the theoretical attractor as well as variance effects might explain the discrepancy
between simulation results and predictions.
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Figure 7: An example of network structure in the case of an internal attractor (100 agents, θ = 0.99,
e = 0.7 and p = 0.25). Arrows indicate who is the friend of whom. The graph shows the ten hubs
and ten authorities of the network (a Pajek plot). Authorities are all of altruist type (A) while
hubs are all of selfish (E) or reciprocator (R) type.
In our model, authorities are agents with lots of friends, and hubs are agents with
lots of hub relationships. The plot of the directed network formed by the address
books around the attractor (settings 2) reveals an interesting structure: the first
hubs are always of altruist type, the first authorities are always of reciprocator or
egoist type. For example, figure 7 represents the ten hubs and ten authorities of a
network of 100 vertices with θ = 0.99, e = 0.7 and p = 0.25. All the ten authorities
are altruist while the ten hubs are all of selfish or reciprocator type.
This kind of organization of the social network suggests an explanation of coop-
eration than differs from the cliquishness of cooperators: popularity of cooperators.
The details of the activity equations in the infinite population approximation sup-
port this view. We can see that while altruists are more likely to be authorities,
selfish agents and reciprocators are more likely to be hubs. This emphasizes the
importance of having the three types of agents to get heterogeneous equilibriums at
behavioral level. Types maintain for different reasons: altruists because they have
a lot of friends and among them both altruists and reciprocators; reciprocators be-
cause they avoid being exploited by selfish agents and still have some friends among
altruists, selfish agents because they exploit altruists.
We will notice passing, that this simulation is also a case of emergence of cooper-
ation from an initial population that had only 1% of altruist agents. In most models
explaining cooperation, especially models based on cliquishness, sustainability only
is explained because the model requires that the proportion of altruists passes a
certain threshold to be sustainable. In these cases, emergence cannot be explained.
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4. Scenarios for emergence of cooperation
Our initial aim was to explain the sustainability of altruists in presence of selfish
agents. We can wonder whether the presence of reciprocators is contingent or nec-
essary. It might be hard to study this question from a computational point of view
because, as a matter of emergence, a simulation can only prove that emergence is
possible (by the presentation of a simulation where emergence took place) but not
that it is impossible. We will thus turn again toward the analytical model to get
some insight.
Theorem 2. For an infinite population of selfish and altruist agents, an all-selfish
population is an evolutionary stable state (ESS).
Proof. 2 If we develop pialtruists − piselfish|δ=0 in power of γ at the origin we have:
pialtruists − piselfish = −(1− e)2p(1− θ)
1− θ − 2ep+ (1− e)
θ
1− θγ + ◦(γ) (3)
The first coefficient of this development is always negative and the second always
positive. This implies that a population of selfish agents is an evolutionary stable
state (ESS) when selfish and altruist are the only available strategies.
.
The consequence of theorem 2 is that emergence of cooperation is never possible
through introduction of few altruists in large population of selfish agents (except in
the trivial case p = 0). Nevertheless it often can maintain for some values of e and
p once this proportion passes a certain threshold.
Theorem 3. For an infinite population of selfish agents and reciprocators, the evo-
lution is neutral between the two types in the area δ < p
r
+ (1−p−r)γ
r
.
Proof. 3 The proof of this theorem is straight forward since for δ < p
r
+ (1−p−r)γ
r
,
reciprocators and selfish agents have the same rule of behavior and thus pir = pis.
.
The study of the fitness expression in the domain δ > p
1−p) shows that above
this threshold, reciprocators are sustainable even if they are first mover cooperators.
Since this threshold is quite high, and given that neutral evolution is a very slow
process, it is unlikely that cooperation emerges that way in large populations.
The consequences of theorems 2 and 3 is that the most probable scenario for
emergence of cooperation starting from an all-selfish population is two folds: 1) a
slow neutral evolution from a mixed population of selfish agents and few recipro-
cators ; 2) when there are enough reciprocators, altruists become viable and can
invade the population. For large populations, these three types are consequently a
minimal set for emergence of cooperation starting from an all-selfish population. An
example of such emergence is given by simulation of figure 6.
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5. Limits of the model
The modeling activity necessarily simplifies real phenomena. Modelers have to
make choices, and the resulting models are not necessarily commensurable. However,
we will highlight some of the limits of our model that future works could eventually
address, and contrast, in the next section, our results to the existing literature.
First of all, our model assumes that population size remains constant through-
out the co-evolutionary process. This is clearly a simplification, and the role of a
changing population size remains an open problem.
The model also assumes that agents know the proportions of other agents types
in the population and take their decision accordingly. Although this is a standard
assumption, it would have been more realistic to assume that agents learn these
proportions during their interactions, updating their belief with a bayesian rule for
example. It is not clear at first glance whether these refinements would be favorable
or detrimental to cooperation.
An other issue is the choice of the initial set of strategies. This choice is itself
influenced by the mode of strategy update (e.g. replicator dynamics vs. imitation
of the most successful agent). We have considered here a set based on the two most
common rules, All-D and All-C, and we can question the stability of our results
toward a modifications of the strategy space and interactions procedures. There have
been a huge variety of strategies proposed so far in PD games and there is few chances
that we could get general results about stability of cooperation independently of a
precise definition of the strategy space. For example, [12] demonstrated t that the
outcome of a spatial prisoner's dilemma was undecidable: we know that there is no
general procedure to decide whether a given strategy will invade a given ecology. The
most important conclusion of theorems 1-3 is thus: in presence of altruist and selfish
agents, a minimal set for emergence of cooperation has at least three strategies.
Nevertheless we can provide some intuitions about the stability and robustness
our result concerning emergence of cooperation against some alternative choices.
First, we can wonder whether cooperation would still be sustainable in case of a
simultaneous PD. Simultaneous PD would require completely different settings since,
for example, the implementation of a reciprocating strategy would imply that agents
have at least a one step memory for all interaction outcomes (in our model agents
only keep in memory successful first move interactions and use the sequential aspect
of the interaction to eventually reciprocate when playing as second mover). But
as highlighted before, the success of cooperation is due to the high popularity of
altruists. This means that the important thing is that altruists can be recognized by
other altruists and reciprocators in first move interactions so that offspring of these
two populations make friends quicker than other types. This is still compatible with
simultaneous PD, since it is possible to detect altruistic behaviors in simultaneous
PD game. Nevertheless, further studies are needed to confirm this intuition.
Second, we can wonder whether cooperation would still be sustainable if we were
to introduce errors in implementation of actions. It is well known that this kind of
errors is detrimental to cooperation. However, we conjecture that while errors will
certainly decrease the rate of cooperation in a population, cooperation will still be
sustainable for a large domains of the parameters space when the level of errors is
no too high. In our model, agents are bound to meet several cooperators because
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of errors in the partner selection process. Consequently their address book quickly
has few names. Errors on implementation of actions will certainly shorten this
list of relationships, by discarding cooperators that would have played D by error.
However, if not too frequent, they should not qualitatively change the distribution
of non-empty address books and preserve patterns of interaction. However, the
interplay between errors on actions, errors level on partners selection and cooperation
is highly none trivial and is worth being further investigated.
Last, we can question the choice of a replicators dynamics for the evolution
of agent's types. The replicator dynamics is a standard in the modeling of social
dilemma. Although we can question its relevance in the modeling of cooperation in
the case of human species (see for example [5]), it is a good framework to study the
role of emerging social structures in situations of social dilemma where cooperation
is a dominated strategy.
6. Comparison with related work
We have presented here a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary
games that highlights the role of network formation and effects of network structure.
In line with empirical data, it proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence of
heterogeneous types (heterogeneity in rule for changing behavior), and in particular
the sustainability of altruism (presence of unconditional cooperators) even in case
of strong social dilemma. We used a hybrid approach with both analytical and
computational insights. We will now discuss the contributions of our model in the
light of these different points.
Emergence of cooperation occurs when a population of cooperators invades a
population of defectors. This is an important issue, both from the methodological
point of view - models of cooperations should not assume a priori that cooperation
is already there -, and from an empirical point of view - lots of natural ecosystems
are thought to have evolved from non cooperative states (unicellular organisms to
multicellular, individuals to societies, etc.). Many explanations of cooperation rely
on a cliquishness effect, which holds only once the proportion of cooperators is suf-
ficiently large. For example, [17], [16], [10], [10], [11] and [23] consider evolutions
where the initial proportion of cooperators in the population is at least 50%. Thus,
these models, without further results, are not appropriate to study the origin of
cooperation in natural systems. On the contrary, our model proposes a clear sce-
nario for emergence of cooperation, which moreover predicts different steps for the
resilience of cooperative states: a slow neutral evolution with the introduction of
reciprocators followed, by a faster evolution with the introduction of altruists.
Another nice property of our model is that it explains cooperation even in cases
of strong social dilemma where the temptation to defect is high (p > 0), i.e. for
parametrization of the social dilemma game where both the ratio between (D,C)
vs. (C,C) payoffs and (D,D) vs. (C,D) are high. For example, in [16] or [22], the
dilemma is weak since the difference between (D,D) v.s (C,D) payoffs is an   0.
In other models (e.g. the seminal model of [20]), cooperation collapses as soon the
ratio between (D,C) payoffs and (C,C) payoffs is too high.
Network formation and effect of network structure is a quite recent concern in
social dilemma modeling. We can distinguish models that consider static networks
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with different topologies ([17], [16], [22], [11], [18], [9], [25]) from models that take
into account networks dynamics.
Among these later, one of the most common process considered for network for-
mation is the choice and refusal mechanism ([3], [8], [4], [14], [10], [23]). Players
select their partners in function of the productivity of the interaction and can refuse
to interact with a player if the expected associated payoffs fall below a given thresh-
old. In those models, the main conclusions is that selection of interactions with
choice and refusal enables cooperators to interact preferentially with other coop-
erators, which provides the network with the appropriate level of cliquishness to
sustain cooperation. This contrasts with our explanation in terms of popularity of
cooperating agents.
This explanation is related to the number of interactions per agents rather than
to the possibility to form cliquish communities. A similar explanation have been
proposed in [21]. However, there are substantial differences with our approach.
[21] consider a mixed population of agents of types A and B that can create or
prune links at different rates, and interact with all the agents they are linked to
at a given period. At each time step, a link between an agent of type i and an
agent of type j is created (resp. pruned) with probably αij (resp. βij). Thus, this
approach can be said link centered whereas our can be said agent centered. The
advantage of the agent centered view is that it takes into account time constraints.
Think for example at sending personalized e-mail. It takes time to interact and
one cannot take an arbitrary number of initiatives within a limited period of time.
This is the reason why we choose to limit to one the number of interactions for
first movers. The second important difference with [21] is that the authors propose
results concerning sustainability of cooperation in the domain where the timescales
between the network update and the strategy update are very different (θ  1 or
θ ≈ 1). This enables to neglect the process of link formation through time. Thus,
they conclude that "the linking dynamics introduces a simple transformation of the
payoff matrix" of the prisoner's dilemma game. We saw that, at least in our case,
this approximation does not hold if the condition (θ  1 or θ ≈ 1) is not met. In
that case, it is necessary to take into account the ontogeny of agents' networks, and
expected payoffs are complicated functions of δ, γ and θ.
Last, contrary to all the above models, our approach introduces errors or per-
turbations in the choice of partners through the parameter e. Up to our knowledge,
this dimension of the interactions between agents has not been addressed in previ-
ous models. For example, this could bring new insights into mobility effect (high e
being correlated with high mobility): contrary to [24], we would conclude that high
mobility is detrimental to cooperation.
To conclude this section, we would like to finish on a methodological point. Most
approach mentioned so far present either computational studies or analytical solu-
tions of a simplified version of the initial problem. For this study, we pay a particular
attention to highlight the convergence between simulations and analytical insights.
Such a dual approach is desirable in case of models that might present internal ESS.
Indeed, in case of heterogeneous populations under slow evolutionary process (which
is typically what happens around an internal ESS), computational models alone are
poorly informative as long as there is no way, after a finite number of iterations, to
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assess how close a simulation is from the attractor. With a computational approach
alone, one cannot be sure that the heterogeneity observed in the population is not
an artefact due to an insufficient number of iterations. In these cases, analytical
insights give supplementary evidences against the artefact hypothesis and strongly
supports the understanding of the model.
7. Conclusions
We took the well-known paradox of the PD to illustrate the importance of net-
work formation in the understanding of social phenomena. We proposed a models
where heterogeneous agents modify their neighborhoods according to their types,
while the global network configuration determines the fitness of the different types.
This co-evolution between agents' types and network patterns leads to characteristic
network structures that depart from the traditional cliquish structures that account
for heterogeneous cooperative equilibria. In our case, it is an increase in activity
of popular (cooperative) agents that explains the emergence and sustainability of
cooperation.
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A. Mathematical Appendix
A.1. Proof of theorem 1
Proof. 1
We will note 4 = {(γ, δ)|δ + γ ≤ 1; γ ≥ 1; δ ≥ 1} and ni the number of agents
of type i. To compute the mean payoffs of each type we need first to compute the
probability for an agent to be connected.
Lemma 4 (Theorem 1). Let P1 be a sub-population of agents that do relationships
(out-coming links) only with agents from a sub-population P2 in proportion λ. The
probability that a random agent i ∈ P has already a relationship in P2 is Pconnect(λ) =
1− 1−θ
1−(1−λ)θ
Proof. Let i be an agent of age t in P1. The probability it hasn't met any agent
from P2 during its life is (1− λ)t . Consequently, the probability that agent i of age
t hasn't any relationship in P2 is 1− (1− λ)t. (We neglect here cases where the sole
relationship of an agent dies before it meet an other agent from P2. This is a good
approximation as soon as e.θ.λ is not too small).
The distribution of ages in the population has the generatrice function f(z) =
(1 − θ)∑t>0 θt.zt. Then the probability for an agent to be connected has the gen-
eratrice function Φ(z)(1 − 1−θ
1−(1−lambda)θz + 1 − 1−θ1−(1−lambda)θ ). We deduce the mean
connectedness with agents of the considered types(s):
Pconnect(λ) = 1− 1− θ
1− (1− λ)θ )
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and its variance is :
V arconnect(λ) = (1− 1− θ
1− (1− λ)θ )
1− θ
1− (1− λ)θ
In the area δ > p
r
+ (1−p−r)γ
r
, the domain concerned by emergence of cooperation,
only altruists cooperate first move. Consequently, they are the only one to be able
to get new relationships with altruist and reciprocators. Their probability to have
a non empty address book is then Pconnect(γ + δ). Selfish agents and reciprocators,
on the contrary, can only do relationships with altruists. Their probability to be
connected is then Pconnect(γ). We can now compute the mean payoffs for each type.
Payoffs terms are composed of two independent terms: the expected payoffs as first
mover and the expected payoffs as second mover. For each of them we have to treat
separately cases where the agent is connected, cases where it is not, and exploration
moves. We thus get:
piselfish = Pconnect(γ)[(1− e) + e.p(1− γ) + e.γ]... #1
+(1− Pconnectt(γ))[p.(1− γ) + γ]... #2
+e.[Pconnect(γ).(1− γ).p+ Pconnect(γ + δ).γ]... #3
+(1− Pconnect(γ)).(1− γ).p+ (1− Pconnect(γ + δ)).γ #4
With :
• #1 : i is connected, 1rst move interactions
• #2 : i is not connected, 1rst move interactions at random
• #3 : 2nd move interactions with connected agents
• #4 : 2nd move interactions with not connected agents
After simplifications we get:
pis = (1− e)(2p(1− γ + θ(γ − 1)) + γ1 + θ(γ − 1) +
(1− θ)γ
1− (1− (δ + γ))θ ) + 2e(p(1− γ) + γ)
Similarly we have :
pireciprocator = Pconnect(γ)((1− e).r + e.(γ + p(1− γ))) + ... #1
+(1− Pconnect(γ))(p.(1− γ) + γ) + ... #2
+e.(Pconnect(γ).(1− γ).p+ Pconnect(γ + δ).[(1− e).r.γ/(γ + δ) + e.γ.r]) + ... #3
+(1− Pconnect(γ)).(1− γ).p+ (1− Pconnect(γ + δ)).γ.r #4
After simplification we get :
pir = (1− e)(θγ(r + 2p− 1) + γ + 2p(1− γ − θ)1 + θ(γ − 1) +
rγ
1− (1− (δ + γ))θ ) + e(2p+ γ(1− 2p+ r))
And finally :
pialtruists = Pconnect(γ + d)[(1− e).r + e.r.(γ + d)] + ... #1
(1− Pconnect(γ + d)).(d+ γ).r + ... #2
Pconnect(γ).(1− e).r.d/g + Pcconnect(γ + d).[(1− e).r.γ/(γ + d) + e.γ.r] + ... #3
(1− Pconnect(γ + d)).γ.r + ... #4
After simplification we get :
pia = (1− e)( rθδ1 + θ(γ − 1) +
r(2γ + δ)
1− (1− (δ + γ))θ ) + er(δ + 2γ)
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A.2. Theoretical activity
To compute the theoretical mean activity, we follow the same guidelines as for the
expected payoffs, the difference being that we have to take into account interactions
with null payoffs.
The mean activity of agents can be split into two independents terms: the mean
activity as first mover and the mean activity as second mover. For each of these
terms, we have to treat separately cases where the agent is connected, cases where
it is not, and exploration moves. We thus get:
Acts = 1 + ... #1 +#2
e.[Pconnect(γ).(1− γ) + Pconnect(γ + δ).γ] + ... #3
(1− Pconnect(γ)).(1− γ) + (1− Pconnect(γ + δ)).γ + ... #4
• #1 : i is connected, 1rst move interactions
• #2 : i is not connected, 1rst move interactions at random
• #3 : 2nd move interactions with connected agents
• #4 : 2nd move interactions with not connected agents
Similarly for reciprocators:
Actr = 1 + ... #1 +#2
+e.Pconnect(γ).(1− γ) + Pconnect(γ + δ).[(1− e).γ/(γ + δ) + e.γ]) + ... #3
+(1− Pconnect(γ)).(1− γ) + (1− Pconnect(γ + δ)).γ + ... #4
and for altruists:
Acta = 1 + ... #1 +#2
+Pconnect(γ).[e.(1− γ) + (1− e).d/γ] + Pconnect(γ + δ).[e.γ + (1− e).γ/(γ + δ)] + ... #3
+(1− Pconnect(γ)).(1− γ) + (1− Pconnect(γ + δ)).γ + ... #4
The relative activity of altruists (resp. reciprocators) is thus: RAa = ActaActs (resp. RAr =
Actr
Acts
).
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B. Computational Appendix
Lets P (t) be the population at time t. We give here the algorithm used for the simulations.
Parameters and notations The parameters are:
• e ∈ [0, 1]: Exploration parameter
• (p, r) ∈ [0, 12 ]2: parameter of the social dilemma
• θ ∈ [0, 1]: parameter defining the mean lifetime expectancy.
Initial conditions : N agents with empty address books from the three types: altruist,
reciprocator and selfish, in proportion γ ,δ and (1− δ − γ) .
At each period of time t :
Set all payoffs to 0
Interaction (parallel updating):
1. For each agent in P (t), a binomial random variable of mean (1− e) is drawn to determine if
its partner will be chosen in its address book or at random in the population. In all cases,
if its address book is empty, the partner is chosen at random.
2. In case of interaction as first mover with an unknown partner, the partner is chosen at
random and the action is determined according to table 2.
3. In case of interaction as first mover in address book, the action is determined according to
table 3:
• Altruists and reciprocators choose a relationship at random and play C.
• Selfish look for an altruist and defect. If they only know reciprocators, they choose
one at random and cooperate. In all other cases, their interact with an agent taken
at random in whole population
4. Each agent plays as second mover according to its type (cf. table 3).
5. Each first mover adds the name of its second mover partner in its address book if the partner
has cooperated. Selfish have special categories: altruist (obtained after a (D,C) results) -
reciprocator or altruist (obtained after a (C,C) result) - reciprocator (obtained after a
(D,D) result after interaction with an agent of the category reciprocator or altruist.
Selection :
1. After interactions took place, the fitness of each agent is given by the sum of all dyadic
interactions payoffs for this period.
2. Each agent dies with a probability (1− θ) .
3. Died agents are replaced with new agents with empty address books. Died agents are
removed from the address books of their friends. This leads to the population P (t+ 1).
4. Types of new agents are determined by a replicator dynamics indexed on the total payoffs
of agents from P (t): for each new born agent, an agent is selected in P (t) with a probability
proportional to its fitness. The new agent inherits the type of this particular agent.
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